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Abstract
Research on mandated occupational role change focuses on jurisdictional
conflict to explain change failure. The authors’ study of the English National
Health Service highlights the role of occupational dispositions in
shaping how mandated role change is implemented by members of multiple
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occupational groups. The authors find that tension stemming from mis-
aligned dispositions may emerge as members of different occupations
interact during their role change implementation efforts. Depending on
dispositional responses to tension, change may fail as members of the dif-
ferent occupations avoid interactions. This suggests that effective
role change can be elusive even in the initial absence of conflicting occupa-
tional interests.
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In professionalized settings, tasks and associated responsibilities are
formally distributed across occupational groups. However, this distri-
bution is not stable, as the highly professionalized health-care field
(Freidson, 2001) has witnessed over the past decades (Nancarrow &
Borthwick, 2005). For instance, quality-focused policies led to the cre-
ation of new quality-focused roles (Menchik & Meltzer, 2010;
Timmermans, 2003; Wiener, 2000), while attempts to increase
community-based care led to the establishment of new advanced prac-
tice nursing and allied health roles (Chreim et al., 2007; Reay et al.,
2006). Such changes in occupational roles in health care are often an
outcome of policy mandates (Allen, 2000; Kellogg, 2014; Nancarrow &
Borthwick, 2005; Wiener, 2000).
As emphasized by Abbott (1988), the implementation of policies
designed to change occupational roles is not uniform. Occupations
can resist, contest, or negotiate mandated role changes at a field level,
shaping how they might be implemented (Anteby et al., 2016; Starr,
1984). In addition, interactions within and across occupations in the
workplace can impact whether and how mandated changes are actually
put into practice on the front line (Allen, 2000; Givan, 2016; Kitchener,
2000; Wiedner et al., 2017). Dynamics in the workplace can ultimately
prevent effective policy implementation (Givan, 2016; Kellogg, 2011).
Prior research primarily focuses attention on jurisdictional conflict
(Abbott, 1988)—that is, conflict between professions for control over
work tasks—as the mechanism that might explain whether policy ini-
tiatives and other field-level pressures results in changes in workplace-
level occupational mandates and roles. For example, Allen (2000)
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demonstrates how jurisdictional conflict between nurses and doctors
shaped the redefinition of occupational role relations in response to a
range of policy initiatives in a hospital in the English National Health
Service (NHS). She highlights the importance of jurisdictional conflict
by showing that nursing managers proactively defined new nursing roles
to prevent medics from imposing them on nurses. Others similarly point
to jurisdictional conflict as a mechanism shaping how roles are renego-
tiated in practice in response to policy initiatives (Kellogg, 2014;
Nancarrow & Borthwick, 2005; Weinberg, 2004).
Although these studies provide valuable insights, they risk simplis-
tically portraying individuals as rational actors whose actions and
interactions are motivated by their jurisdictional interests. A broad
range of research, however, suggests that the negotiation of occupa-
tional mandates, and roles in the workplace are shaped by a wide
range of factors, including local work demands (Nancarrow, 2015;
Xyrichis et al., 2017) and work ethos (Fayard et al., 2017; Nelsen &
Barley, 1997). By moving beyond jurisdictional conflict, scholars have
focused attention on dispositions—the categories of perception and
appreciation, gained through lived experience (Bourdieu &
Wacquant, 1992, p. 11)—in shaping how members of an occupation
think and act. As an important driver of how members of occupations
interact (e.g., Oborn & Dawson, 2010), dispositions may be critical in
shaping how mandated role changes are negotiated between members
of different occupations in the workplace. All of this suggests that a
focus on jurisdictional conflict alone may not fully explain why a
mandated role change may or may not succeed. In particular, we
still lack knowledge concerning how dynamics that are shaped by
occupational dispositions rather than jurisdictional conflict can
affect mandated role change implementation.
In this article, we present an inductive analysis of local responses to a
policy designed to shift regional public health-care budgeting responsi-
bilities from public health-care system administrators (known as ‘com-
missioners’) to local primary care physicians (known as ‘General
Practitioners’ (GPs)) in the NHS to further knowledge on how occupa-
tional dispositions can inhibit mandated role change implementation.
The policy initiative, known as ‘Liberating the NHS,’ was described as
the most fundamental restructuring in the organization’s 60-year histo-
ry (BBC News Online, 2012). Initiated with the rationale that financial
decisions should be guided by a clinical perspective (Department of
Health, 2010, p. 1), the initiative mandated that primary care physicians
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across the country manage more than 60% (approximately £60bn) of
the total NHS budget.
We find that differences in disposition across occupations can inhibit
effective policy implementation even when members of the relevant
occupational groups are initially eager to alter their roles. Our analysis
suggests that the lack of effective policy implementation results from
misaligned occupational dispositions as members of each group engage
in actions that are interpreted negatively by members of the other occu-
pational group. Dependent on their dispositions, these negative inter-
pretations and judgments can lead members of each group to attempt to
limit further interoccupational interactions, inhibiting the implementa-
tion of the mandated role change. We extend prior research by
highlighting the importance of occupational dispositions in shaping
how mandated occupational role changes are negotiated on the ground.
Theoretical Context
Jurisdictional Conflict and Changes in Occupational Roles
The overwhelming focus of prior research on the implementation of
mandated role changes in the workplace is on the role of jurisdictional
conflict in shaping whether or how role changes are implemented.
Policy mandates can trigger both field-level jurisdictional conflict and
workplace-level conflict over the renegotiation of local occupational
mandates and associated occupational roles. An occupational role is
a set of expectations about who does what work, how work should
be performed, and how someone in one occupational role will interact
with others (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1988; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009).
An organization’s work is constituted through a role system that is
comprised of multiple, interdependent and interacting occupational
roles (Abbott, 1988; Bechky, 2003). Due to the interdependent nature
of roles, mandated change in one occupational role necessarily involves
changes to other roles and thereby to the role system (Abbott, 1988;
Eisenstadt et al., 1967; Turner, 1990). Given that different occupational
groups in a role system are constantly competing for jurisdictional con-
trol over valuable or high-status tasks, changes in roles can trigger
jurisdictional conflict.
Extant research has highlighted the importance of jurisdictional con-
flict in contributing to diverse outcomes related to policy implementa-
tion (Ferlie et al., 2005; Kellogg, 2014; McDermott et al., 2013; Nigam
et al., 2016). Moreover, jurisdictional concerns, or the effective ability
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to reduce status hierarchies across well-established jurisdictional
boundaries, are also important in shaping the potential for coordina-
tion and conflict in multiprofessional teams (Edmondson, 2003; Huq
et al., 2017; Nancarrow et al., 2013; Xyrichis et al., 2017).
Consistent with this broader body of research, studies on how
mandated role changes are implemented in the workplace focus on
the importance of jurisdictional conflict in shaping how policy imple-
mentation unfolds (Anteby et al., 2016). This work presupposes that
members of the higher status occupation within a particular role
structure make a judgment about a policy initiative’s impact on
their jurisdictional interests and, based on that judgment, either
engage with implementing the policy or resist it (e.g., Kellogg,
2011; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). For example, Currie et al. (2010)
show that physicians resisted a policy initiative that aimed to bring
cancer genetics care into community-based settings by enhancing the
nursing-genetics role. Physicians continued to have expectations of a
more traditional doctor–nurse working relationship and subverted the
policy by limiting the autonomy of the individuals who assumed
the new nursing roles. Similarly, in a study of reforms related to
the Affordable Care Act, Kellogg shows that members of high-
status occupations resisted performing new tasks that they inter-
preted as requiring the acquisition of “information unrelated to
their professional expertise” (2014, p. 912) and/or as involving
work practices that conflicted with their professional identity and
interests. They were able to subvert the policy by not engaging
with the mandated role changes. Alternatively, Chreim et al. (2007)
demonstrate that primary care physicians judged that a policy initia-
tive to move care toward an interdisciplinary team model would
advance their occupation-specific goals and hence cooperated with
the initiative to introduce new occupational roles within the primary
care setting. In sum, research shows that concerns about jurisdiction-
al interests can shape occupation members’ actions in a broad range
of settings, including implementation of mandated role changes in
the workplace.
An exclusive focus on jurisdictional concerns, however, may be
incomplete. Although professions and professionals can and do act in
ways that are interest-driven, this behavior is layered onto a more com-
plex set of motivations and rationales that shape action. This may
matter in shaping how members of an occupation act and interact in
the workplace generally and how they respond to mandated role change
specifically.
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The Role of Occupational Dispositions in Implementing Mandated
Role Change
Potentially complementing a focus on jurisdictional conflict, a large but
disparate body of research suggests that occupational dispositions—
which structure or guide members’ interpretations and habitual actions
(Bourdieu, 1985)—shape how professions act and interact (Anteby
et al., 2016; Bosk, 2003; DiBenigno, 2018; Hughes, 1981). According
to Hughes (1981),
[l]iterature and common sense . . .have given us stereotyped pictures of
persons engaged in various occupations: the old-maid school teacher, the
parson, the village blacksmith, the farmer, the professor, the politician,
the financier. All these and many other types so created are expected to
react to the situations of life in a characteristic manner. (p. 24)
He describes the distinctive culture and technique of a person’s occu-
pation as appearing in the individual as personal traits. These occupa-
tional dispositions are inculcated through processes of occupational
training and socialization (Bosk, 2003; Hughes, 1981; Pratt et al., 2006).
Occupational dispositions become an engrained and habitual way of
interpreting the world. For example, engineers routinely view organiza-
tions as machines (Morgan, 2006). According to Lawrence and Lorsch
(1967), distinct work patterns manifest themselves in different goal and
temporal orientations within organizations, such as between sales rep-
resentatives and members of R&D teams. Dougherty (1992) encapsu-
lates the idea of occupational dispositions in noting that members of
differing occupations, even when forming part of the same organiza-
tion, inhabit different “thought worlds.”
In shaping worldviews, occupational dispositions can structure how
members of an occupation behave as part of their routine work
and beyond. For instance, in a study of clinicians’ practices at a
mental health clinic, Kirschner and Lachicotte (2001) observed super-
vision meetings in which matters were often left unresolved, mirroring
the open-endedness of “the structure of psychodynamic therapy
itself” (p. 448).
Moreover, occupational dispositions might shape how members of
different occupational groups interact with one another. For example,
Currie et al. (2010) show that nurses who are formally in charge of
designing and implementing change may struggle when an initiative
involves physicians, in part because their dispositions may prevent
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them from challenging higher status medical professionals. Wiedner
et al. (2017) witnessed similar dynamics with regard to primary care
physicians struggling to implement changes to local health-care services
due to being deferential to higher status hospital consultants. By con-
trast, Pouthier (2017) suggests that shared dispositions, exemplified by
shared identification rituals involving joking and griping, can enable
coordination in cross-professional teams delivering palliative care to
cancer patients. In this case, shared dispositions develop across occu-
pations within a specialty area (palliative care) and differ from the
dispositions in other specialty areas (e.g., acute care).
As an important driver of how members of an occupational
group will behave and, specifically, interact with others, occupational
dispositions are likely to play a role in how mandated role changes are
negotiated. A dispositional focus, then, may complement the focus on
jurisdictional concerns that predominates prior research. Given the lack
of research examining dispositions in processes of implementing man-
dated role change, we thus address the research question: How do occu-
pational dispositions impact interactions between members of different
occupational groups in the process of mandated role implementation?
Methods
This article is based on an ethnographically informed, in-depth single
case study, which is appropriate to gain insights concerning a phenom-
enon that has remained undertheorized (Ozcan et al., 2017; Yin, 2003).
Our qualitative study concerning mandated occupational role change in
the NHS started in 2010 in response to the government’s announcement
of a policy to radically restructure how the public health-care system
was managed. The policy involved shifting responsibilities for managing
local public health-care budgets from administrators to GPs.
This was not the first effort to engage GPs in managing public
health-care budgets. Around twenty years earlier, GPs across the coun-
try had been given opportunities to make certain budget allocation
decisions, which were initially restricted to nonurgent elective and com-
munity care. However, “GP fundholding” was abolished after only
6 years. Subsequent attempts to engage GPs in health-care systems
management included the national “practice-based commissioning”
policy (in 2004) that allowed GPs to advise local health-care
management agencies on budget allocations. Yet, these agencies,
which were largely staffed by nonmedically trained administrators,
maintained responsibility for health-care management decisions.
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Studying responses to a policy designed to radically change admin-
istrators’ and physicians’ responsibilities provides an extreme case with
high revelatory potential (Siggelkow, 2007) for understanding dynamics
that may occur following attempts to change an established multioccu-
pational role structure. Unlike other cases of expanding physicians’
roles by increasing managerial duties (e.g., Kitchener, 2000), successful-
ly implementing this radical change appeared to require the transfer of a
complex and highly specialized body of knowledge from those who had
been performing relevant tasks to those who were assuming responsi-
bilities for them. It therefore required interoccupational collaboration.
We began by collecting data to help us understand public health-care
systems management (“commissioning”) and how stakeholders reacted
to the change policy. With regard to the former, we primarily reviewed
academic literature (e.g., Flynn & Williams, 1997) and reports pub-
lished by the U.K. government and relevant think tanks (e.g., Cohen
& Light, 2003; Department of Health, 2005; Woodin & Wade, 2007)
and also interviewed a small number of administrators and clinicians
across the country. Through interviews, along with articles from the
media and trade journals (e.g., Dixon & Ham, 2010; West, 2011), we
sought to gauge responses to the policy.
Our objective at this stage was to identify a relevant research site that
would allow us to observe efforts to implement mandated role change.
Given uncertainty about whether the policy would be implemented at
all, we decided to focus on health-care management agencies where
administrators had started preparing for change and where local GPs
appeared keen to assume commissioning responsibilities.
Having gained access to one such site, the first author received per-
mission to conduct further interviews and attend management-related
meetings. This was followed by two 3-month periods of observations,
in which the first author shadowed administrators (Czarniawska, 2007)
for 3 to 4 full days a week to gain an in-depth understanding of how they
were adjusting to the new policy and whether and how GPs were becom-
ing more involved in commissioning-related work. In total, the study
involved 3 years in the field, from the initial interviews to identify a
research site to interviews conducted after the two periods of observation.
In this time, we had conducted more than 700hours of direct observa-
tion, reviewed 20Gb of confidential documents, and completed a total of
66 semistructured interviews with administrators in the region (42), local
GPs (9—all of whom initially expressed a desire in becoming involved in
aspects of commissioning), and other stakeholders with some involve-
ment in aspects of public health-care management (15). In addition to
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semistructured interviews, the first author also asked questions during
periods of observation while attempting to minimize interference and
disruption for participants. In this respect, informal chats with adminis-
trators and GPs before and directly after commissioning-related meetings
were especially valuable. As the study progressed, we became intrigued
by our observation that knowledge sharing was limited despite initial
enthusiasm and focused our analysis on understanding why.
Our ongoing data collection and analysis proceeded iteratively, with
emerging questions generating provisional answers, further data collec-
tion, and further questions (Alvesson & K€arreman, 2007; Wiedner &
Ansari, 2017). Through this process, we identified interoccupational
tension, and the negative judgments that both administrators and
GPs formed of the other group in the course of negotiating new
roles, as important. We then focused our efforts on identifying the
specific sources of tension and actors’ responses. Repeatedly comparing
our emerging interpretations of the empirical data with theory (Mantere
& Ketokivi, 2013), specifically an emergent focus on occupational dis-
positions, we progressively abstracted from our particular case to devel-
op a theoretical model specifying how misaligned occupational
dispositions may inhibit mandated role change implementation in prac-
tice. Examples of data for each of the themes that comprise our model
are presented in Table 1 of the online appendix.
Findings
We found that implementing mandated role change involved members of
the occupations whose roles were being altered interacting with one
another to negotiate their new roles. These interactions were substantially
influenced by the dispositions of the different occupational groups, which
ultimately inhibited successful policy implementation. Figure 1 presents
our model of relevant dynamics. It shows that the nature of GPs’ and
administrators’ work and power relations shaped their occupational dis-
positions. Although dispositions were principally shaped by long-
standing work practices and established power relations, the latter were
somewhat impacted by the mandated role change itself. These disposi-
tions, in turn, shaped how members of each group interacted in their
efforts to negotiate their new roles. The same dispositions, along with the
degree of misalignment between them, influenced how members of each
group interpreted and judged each other’s actions. High misalignment
between GPs’ and administrators’ dispositions generated tension in inter-
occupational interactions, leading to negative judgments and
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interpretations. Both groups, in accordance with their dispositions,
responded to emerging tension in ways that reduced further interoccupa-
tional interaction. This contributed to a lack of transfer of
commissioning-related activities to GPs, thereby inhibiting the implemen-
tation of the mandated role change and ultimately reinforcing the exist-
ing role system. We unpack these dynamics later.
Occupational Dispositions
In the following, we contrast each occupational group’s primary focus
of interest, typical decision-making speed and routine enactment of
discretion with one another. We also consider the immediate impact
of the announcement of the mandated role change.
GPs’ Dispositions. GPs’ primary focus of interest at work concerns diag-
nosing individual patients, prescribing medicine and referring patients to
relevant specialists. As a result, diseases, treatment methods, patients’
responses to them, and individual specialists are more meaningful for
GPs than governance arrangements in the NHS. As one GP noted:
Even if you have been working in the service like I was for all those years,
it is amazing how you don’t really care [about formal organizational
Figure 1. The Role of Occupational Dispositions in Inhibiting Mandated Role
Change Implementation.
10 Work and Occupations 0(0)
structures]. Because you are focused on your insular little GP surgery
world with one patient. (GP #1, interview)
This local focus was confirmed by another GP, who stated: “You can
care, as a GP, about the patient in front of you. You care about your
practice. You can care about a bigger area, but as soon as it becomes
too big, you don’t care” (GP #6, interview).
GPs’ routine work also affects their temporal orientations: GPs typically
diagnose, decide on appropriate treatment methods, and write up a sum-
mary of their consultation in less than 10 minutes (Carr-Hill et al., 1998).
GPs therefore necessarily employ heuristics (Gabbay & Le May, 2004).
Finally, GPs’ relative power vis-à-vis other occupations, specifically
their possession of valued medical knowledge and status as independent
contractors who own their practices, allow them to enact a relatively
high degree of discretion. GPs exercise their professional judgment
when diagnosing patients and suggesting treatment options, arguing
that their personal experiences with patients, medications, and local
specialist services enable them to provide nuanced treatment methods.
As is the case with most professionalized occupations, GPs regularly
resist attempts to limit their discretion: “GPs don’t like being man-
aged . . . and we don’t like being told. So [if someone] wants to change
general practice, we say ‘bugger off!’ (GP #6, interview).”
The U.K. government’s announcement that GPs were going to assume
responsibilities for managing regional health-care budgets (Department of
Health, 2010, p. 27), in addition to previous reforms designed to encour-
age GPs’ input in commissioning, further signaled that GPs were trusted
to make health-care management-related decisions, reinforcing beliefs
that GPs’ high level of discretion is appropriate. In giving them freedom
to shape regional health-care services, the mandated role change appeared
to confirm GPs’ abilities to enact a high degree of discretion beyond their
traditional professional role as clinicians.
Administrators’ Dispositions. In contrast to GPs’ attention to individual
patients and treatment pathways, administrators focused their attention
on the organizational structures and financial flows across the regional
health-care system. Much of their work involved monitoring expendi-
ture, reviewing performance indicators and examining contracts
negotiated with public and private organizations. During meetings,
administrators routinely presented expenditure figures and interorgani-
zational disputes. The focus on these issues stemmed from the central
role of contracts and financial pressures on administrators’ work.
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A particularly telling moment occurred when an administrator deliv-
ered an improvised leaving speech to her colleagues. After beginning to
cry, she stated: “I do hope that I was able to get some money out of
those contracts” (Administrator #22, observation notes).
Unlike GPs, who engaged in rapid, heuristic-based decision making,
administrators were used to being involved in several months-long
decision-making processes. The need to follow national policies and
regulations, coupled with lack of expertise concerning specialized
health-care services, resulted in decisions routinely requiring the input
from a number of stakeholders across several hours-long meetings. This
resulted in decisions, such as awarding or terminating a contract, taking
up to a year. For instance, referring to an initiative to save money by no
longer paying for an underutilized ward in a hospital, one administrator
noted: “We’ve got to go around the scrutiny committee and all the
politicians, the local involvement network, all sorts of other
things . . . you can’t just say this is what [we will do]” (Administrator
#6, interview).
Similarly, local health-care needs assessments required inputs from
several stakeholders and could take longer than 6 months.
Administrators did not consider this slow. Rather, they were to be
expected given “statutory obligations” (Administrator #5, interview).
Finally, administrators’ lack of power limited their ability to enact
discretion. Despite having formal responsibilities for managing budgets
and thereby altering local services, administrators’ abilities to make
decisions to shape the health-care system were constrained. This was
because their lack of clinical expertise limited their ability to evaluate
local services and suggest changes. Furthermore, the existence of
monopoly providers inhibited their ability to threaten the withdrawal
of funding. Large hospitals, in particular, could rely on the media and
politicians to come to their aid if they faced financial difficulties and to
pressure local commissioners to continue to fund services even if they
were unsustainable. As one administrator noted, “if the [commissioning
organization] is ever in the media, then it’s negative: . . . ‘you’re a bunch
of swines because you’re cutting [services]’” (Administrator #8, inter-
view). In addition, the increasing use of standard treatment episode
charges reduced commissioners’ ability to negotiate prices. Most of
the evaluation criteria were also set at a national level, limiting moni-
toring activities to performance indicators and targets that administra-
tors could not influence.
Administrators consequently saw their roles as following procedures,
implementing policies and trying to prevent the financially strained
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local health-care system from collapsing by asking local providers for
ways of increasing efficiency. As one administrator noted:
What you’re doing is, you’ve got to deliver these centrally set targets,
which actually cost more than the resources that you’ve got
anyway . . .We don’t have the capacity or skills or leverage to make
. . .major changes. [We have] very little influence . . .Most of our work
is in terms of working with people to plan or tweak the service models
that we have and the pathways and how do we do that to save money,
basically. (Administrator #3, interview)
Overall, the limited ability to enact discretion manifested itself in behav-
ior that could be described as “follow the leader, who’s also following
his leaders and the SHA [Strategic Health Authority], and so on.”
(Administrator #3, interview)
Shifting commissioning responsibilities from administrators to GPs
meant that the former were now officially assuming a supporting role
for the latter. This shaped dispositions by reinforcing administrators’ def-
erence to GPs because the latter were no longer only associated with high-
status medical knowledge but also with directly affecting their careers.
Dispositional Misalignment Leads to Negative Interpretations
Occupational dispositions can shape actors’ actions and interpretations
in settings beyond their everyday work. These settings include interoc-
cupational interactions in which details concerning policy implementa-
tion are negotiated and role transfer is initiated (see dark-shaded area in
Figure 1). Dispositional misalignment leads certain actions to be inter-
preted as inappropriate, generating interoccupational tension.
The implementation of the mandated role change began with a group
of administrators and GPs who were initially predisposed to making the
initiative a success. Administrators invited GPs to join them at internal
commissioning meetings and meetings with external stakeholders.
The GPs who chose to participate in the first implementation efforts
were regarded as “evangelists” (Administrator #6, interview) who
wanted to play an active role in transforming the local care system.
However, through their interactions, administrators progressively
developed a view of GPs as being ignorant and selfish, and GPs
judged administrators as being slow and inefficient.
Differences between members of the two occupational groups
became evident during commissioning meetings. For instance, in stark
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contrast to the norm of starting a meeting about 5 minutes past the
official starting time to allow attendees to prepare themselves, we
observed that occasionally GPs pushed for meetings to begin early to
save time. Also, GPs at times interrupted and argued with administra-
tors, checked their emails on their phones (“started playing with their
blackberries” according to Administrator #3), or simply left if they
felt that their presence was not required. As one administrator noted:
“I had a meeting the other day . . .where, after half an hour . . . a GP
[suddenly] said, ‘I don’t see what I’m doing here’ . . . and off he walked”
(Administrator #37, interview).
GPs also did not hesitate to voice their opinions and propose solu-
tions to what administrators perceived as highly complex problems that
required extensive analysis and negotiation. As one administrator
noticed, as costs concerning the redesign of a local service were being
discussed, one GP remarked: “by the time this is implemented it will be
down to us to do the commissioning and we’ll just spend the money
intuitively” (Administrator #14, interview). Using intuition contrasted
sharply with administrators’ adherence to formal procedures. In addi-
tion, in contrast to administrators’ focus on numbers that represented
total volumes or averages to evaluate provider organizations, GPs at
times discussed issues that their registered patients were experiencing.
Moreover, recognizing potential conflicts of interest did not deter GPs
from making local health-care management-related suggestions from
which they appeared to personally benefit: “I’m still at a loss as to
why we don’t integrate more [secondary health services] into general
practice; yes, I am biased; I am a GP, but what the hell!” (GP, obser-
vation notes).
In summary, GPs adopted a very direct and personal style, which
was at odds with the diplomatic approaches characteristic of
administrators.
Despite a lack of visible conflict, administrators experienced tension.
This tension arose “based on experience” of interacting with GPs, “not
simply blind prejudice” about them (Administrator #5, interview).
Furthermore, this tension did not appear to stem from jurisdictional
battles as administrators we interviewed largely approved of GPs
having to take “ownership” (Administrator #12) for unpopular decisions.
Notably, administrators interpreted GPs’ behaviors in commissioning-
related activities as potentially disruptive to their everyday work and the
local health-care system. Administrators especially complained about
GPs’ inability to recognize their ignorance about the complexities
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involved in commissioning. For instance, referring to the aforementioned
GP’s comment on intuition, an administrator noted:
You can’t really have a GP come out of a ten minute consultation and in
five minutes, before the next one, get the facts and intuitively spend £200
million of tax payers’ money . . .They can’t be doing that. I think where this
comes from is a remarkable arrogance. (Administrator #14, interview)
Administrators’ interpretations of GPs failing to recognize their igno-
rance and thereby disrupting commissioning became evident in several
interviews:
A GP . . . told me the other day: “We run our own businesses, so of course
we know how this works.” Well, it’s very different running a very small
GP practice of four or five GPs, as opposed to a [multi-]million pound
business! (Administrator #32, interview)
Provider representatives also interpreted GPs’ interjections in meetings
as signaling “a sort of slight lack of awareness . . . as to how partial
[their] knowledge actually is” (Clinical Director #2), with their use of
simplistic analogies betraying the complexity of health-care systems
management:
I specifically remember a meeting in which one GP started by talking
about “let’s think about the analogy of the kitchen. I want the kitchen,
this is the budget I’ve got for it. You want to sell me this kitchen which
has these units, these things and these things, but I don’t like the color of
these units” . . . and we [an administrator and I] were looking at each other
and thinking, “oh God!” (Clinical Director #1). Administrators and other
stakeholders also confided in interviews their worry about GPs’ apparent
focus on their own practices rather than thinking about implications of
commissioning decisions for the entire region. One administrator (#5)
commented that GPs’ general approach to commissioning amounted to
stating “I have this skill and I’ll [provide this service] for this amount of
money, so give me this money to do it”; [which indicated that they] “don’t
seem able to separate their two roles: provider and commissioner.”
Administrators deduced from their observations of GPs’ behavior
that GPs were transferring their habitual ways of working to a setting
where they were out of place, thereby “not bringing out the best in
them” (Administrator #42, interview), which, in turn, generated
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interoccupational tension. As one administrator (#11) commented in an
interview, “we are talking of two organizations with completely differ-
ent styles; GPs coming in and working in a certain way that we are not
accustomed to.”
In line with their acceptance of highly limited discretion based on
their routine work, as well as the reinforcement of unequal power rela-
tions via the mandated change of commissioning responsibilities,
administrators did not challenge GPs in meetings. As one administrator
(#36) noted in an interview, “managers become reserved when you are
around a dominant GP because there is a sense of hierarchy and you are
not meant to argue with your clinical lead.” A provider representative
who witnessed such behavior referred to administrators as “bloody
sycophants” (Clinical Director #1, interview).
Administrators’ deference to GPs contributed to situations in which
the former refused to be seen as guiding the latter, even when they
evidently held relevant knowledge. For instance, at one meeting
about organizational structures concerning community care provision,
GPs asked the community care commissioner which option he would
recommend. In response, the commissioner said he did “not want to
influence” them and that “my view doesn’t matter here. It’s your deci-
sion” (observation notes). Similarly, administrators did not intervene
when GPs agreed in a meeting to amend a contract with a local provider
by adding a clause that was not legally enforceable (observation notes).
Regarding administrators’ general lack of intervention, one administra-
tor (#36) commented in an interview that “you have to suck up to the
clinicians, really. But it is frustrating when you can see that something is
being done that isn’t right.”
Meanwhile, when asked in interviews to assess their meetings with
administrators, several GPs used terms such as “a waste of time” and
“pointless.” One commented about administrators’ adherence to stan-
dard procedures: “they have crap management . . . they were really the
old-school contract management” (GP#6). One GP (#8) noted that
administrators, due to their lack of clinical experience, “have never
seen [a] service [they commission] work and they don’t know what
the pitfalls of it are,” adding that their routine and rigid “segregation”
of tasks related to “finance, contracting, and [designing, as well as mon-
itoring] clinical services” did not make sense. With regard to adminis-
trators’ inflexibility about rescheduling meetings, one GP commented:
I asked [the administrators] to change them to Mondays, because
I thought for the managers it doesn’t really make much difference to
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them. And that caused some hoo-ha, as you heard, at the last meeting:
“Oh, then we can’t get the papers to you [on time]. and . . .” And I was
thinking, “well why? You just release them the day before, as you do with
any meeting.” (GP #2, interview). In interactions with one another, GPs
and administrators largely enacted their traditional roles: GPs, who were
used to high levels of discretion and making relatively quick decisions,
displayed dominance and impatience. Given their traditional focus of
attention on their registered patients, they also brought up issues that
might only affect a small number of individuals or from which they could
personally benefit. Meanwhile administrators—who were used to analyz-
ing contracts and multimillion pound budgets, reaching decisions only
after months of negotiation and deliberation, as well as implementing
orders from those hierarchically above them—largely remained silent or
referred to standard procedures. Interpreting each other’s behavior as
inappropriate, members of both occupations experienced tension.
Responding to Interoccupational Tension by Reducing
Interoccupational Interaction
In addition to contributing to potential interoccupational tension, occu-
pational dispositions also shape responses to tension. Administrators
avoided tension by being deferential to GPs in public while also limiting
GP involvement in their administrative work. GPs, in turn, responded
by avoiding extensive involvement in activities with administrators who
they came to perceive as wasting their time. Taken together, these
responses had the effect of reducing interoccupational interaction, as
shown in our model.
Responding to GPs’ apparent ignorance concerning commissioning,
administrators could have attempted to educate them by exposing them
to the complexity of commissioning tasks. However, given their inter-
pretations of GPs as impatient, aggressive, and unwilling to listen, in
conjunction with their own deference to higher status GPs and their
dependence on GPs for keeping local commissioning jobs, administra-
tors generally concluded that “clearly you can’t just tell GPs” how they
ought to perform their new role (Administrator #32, interview).
Reluctant to directly challenge GPs, administrators adopted other
methods of dealing with tension. In particular, they restricted GPs’
involvement in commissioning by directing them to particular types
of meetings and splitting existing meetings into “operational” (to
which administrators occupying lower pay band positions were invited)
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and “strategic” meetings (to which GPs and senior administrators were
invited). Administrators justified this on the grounds of maximizing
efficiency:
A GP [said to me]: “I need to know everything you know!” And I said . . .,
“you don’t need to know everything I know . . .Your career is as a GP.
You have a huge skill set . . .You set the vision.” (Administrator #42,
interview)
Administrators’ reluctance to reschedule operational meetings to allow
GPs to attend without having to reschedule some of their clinical work
also limited GP involvement in commissioning activities.
Administrators were especially keen for GPs to make use of their
available time by attending public “scrutiny committee” meetings in
which politicians tended to ask difficult questions concerning how the
local health-care system was being managed. As one administrator (#3)
commented, GPs were in a position to dismiss any criticism by stating
“this [system] is better for the patients; what do you know about it?”
Although such meetings arguably provided learning opportunities for
GPs about the political nature of budget allocation decisions, they did
little in terms of increasing their understanding of the day-to-day work
underlying them.
Some administrators recognized that separating commissioning-
related work into separate tasks, undertaken by different groups of
individuals who rarely met each other, was ineffective. In fact, one
administrator had made efforts to combine a few existing work streams.
Nevertheless, the same administrator (#6) also argued in an interview
that GPs “are not going to sit in three hour contract meetings” and
would not want to “deal with basic service issues . . . and all of
that . . . because it takes longer than seven minutes, actually.”
Finally, administrators persuaded GPs to use their valuable time as
effectively as possible by focusing on a few “strategic priorities”
(Administrator #13, ethnographic interview). As a result, GPs had to
provide written justifications for any time spent on commissioning-
related activities to their respective representatives. GPs who recognized
that certain issues, such as redesigning community-based mental health-
care services, were complex and required lengthy negotiations with
stakeholders were unhappy with this arrangement. As a result, one
GP (#5), who had been very active initially, withdrew from all
commissioning-related activities after complaining about this attempt
to limit his involvement.
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Administrators’ responses to tension by reducing interaction were
consistent with their habitual ways of dealing with conflict. Notably,
one administrator (#3) commented that instead of directly confronting
issues, such as underperforming colleagues, “we just work around them
and everybody knows that.”
Unlike administrators, GPs did not appear to be afraid of offending
others (apart from higher status medical doctors) in interoccupational
meetings by being confrontational. However, they seemed to favor
avoiding interoccupational engagement as they became increasingly
frustrated about their lack of perceived progress—or, in their own
words, “got pissed off with the whole thing” (GP#7, interview).
Rather than seeing interactions with administrators as opportunities
for learning about commissioning, GPs increasingly seemed to think
that “going to meetings” meant they had less time to “save lives”
(GP #2, informal conversation). Their disposition to maximize efficien-
cy via quick interventions left little time for finding ways of developing
interoccupational collaboration.
Reduced Interoccupational Interaction Inhibits Effective Role
Change Implementation
Finally, our model highlights that reducing interoccupational interac-
tion inhibits effective role change implementation. This is because
shared understandings of how the new roles should be enacted are
not developed. Consequently, the nature of work and power dependen-
cies of the occupations involved may remain largely unchanged.
In our case, GPs’ exposure to everyday commissioning activities
remained limited as their involvement was directed to attendance at
“strategic meetings.” As a result, 4 years after they had first been
approached by administrators, GPs appeared to still have a rather lim-
ited understanding of the commissioning role. During interviews, GPs
confessed they had difficulties interpreting certain management docu-
ments, not least due to the heavy use of acronyms that they were unable
to decipher. One GP (#9) noted more than 4 years after the policy
announcement that she still did not “know the details of contracting”
in the NHS and wondered why it was so difficult compared with con-
tracting in the private sector.
GPs’ limited attendance of commissioning-related meetings con-
trasted with those of several administrators, who typically spent several
days a week in back-to-back meetings. Asked whether going to so many
meetings was a productive use of their time, one administrator (#37)
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noted that every meeting typically provided “a nugget of information”
that resulted in learning something new and potentially consequential.
Starved of these “nuggets of information,” GPs reinforced their views
of administrators’ work as largely useless.
In addition, because most of the administrative work was performed
outside of the few meetings that GPs attended, GPs began having
doubts about their ability to influence decisions. One GP (#8, interview)
complained about an “illusion of choice” that administrators presented
to GPs, when in fact they had decided beforehand how to proceed.
Meanwhile, administrators’ views of GPs as simply being unable to
understand their work were also reinforced due to GPs’ limited learn-
ing, with one noting, “they understand their world [but] trying to get
them to understand a different world is really quite difficult”
(Administrator #29, interview).
In summary, by directing GPs to a very limited number of specific
types of commissioning-related activities, administrators inhibited GPs’
ability to understand and perform certain tasks that comprised their
extended roles. This was reinforced by GPs’ withdrawal due to frustra-
tion concerning administrators’ apparent lack of guidance and flexibil-
ity. GPs’ existing roles, including their role-specific worldviews, were
thereby left largely unchanged. Administrators consequently predicted
that public health-care commissioning would “go on much as before”
(Administrator #3, interview).
These findings are consistent with other studies that have sought to
evaluate GP-led commissioning across the UK. In particular, they sup-
port McDermott et al.’s (2017) claim that GPs can only “add value” to
health-care commissioning if extensive “time and effort” has been
invested “in preparing those involved” to ensure “that they systemati-
cally gather evidence about service gaps and problems” (p.10). They
also support the observation made by the same researchers that GPs
have limited their engagement in certain commissioning-related activi-
ties based on perceptions that they “are not a good use of GP time”
(2017, p. 8). Importantly, this article adds insights into how this prep-
aration and engagement may fail to emerge by foregrounding the role
of misaligned occupational dispositions in shaping interoccupational
interactions.
Departures From the Model
The narrative above may give the impression that occupational disposi-
tions created strong misalignment between every GP and every
20 Work and Occupations 0(0)
administrator, triggering universal resentment and a complete unwilling-
ness to collaborate. Although our model reflects the predominant themes
emanating from our analysis, we did witness a few outliers that suggest
that occupational misalignment varies in practice and that interventions
designed to change the above described dynamics could succeed.
With regard to occupational misalignment, we noticed that a small
number of semiretired GPs appeared to be more accepting of admin-
istrators’ work style, including lengthy meetings and rigid procedures.
These few GPs continued to attend commissioning-related meetings
until we stopped collecting data. Apart from these individuals simply
having more time to engage in nonclinical work, as well as their desire
to reduce their routine clinical work by “learning new skills” (GP #1,
interview), their continued interoccupational interaction may be attrib-
utable to their previous work in GP fundholding and engagement with
administrators in relation to earlier reforms. In other words, their expe-
riences may have reduced the occupational misalignment between them-
selves and administrators.
With regard to possible interventions, GPs’ reflections on their experi-
ences in interviews are potentially instructive. For instance, one GP (#7)
commented that due to GPs being used to having a high degree of auton-
omy, “they are always able to speak their minds. So, that is a
strength . . . but it also means that if they are not self-disciplined and sen-
sitive enough, you can end up with dysfunctional meetings.” Another GP
(#9) concurred that her colleagues could be quite aggressive, stating, “that
is very true. I have seen that . . . and they might not really know what they
are talking about.” Yet another GP (#6) admitted that her own behavior
had been problematic (or had made her look “like a complete idiot” in her
words), as she later, when taking part in a leadership training program,
came to realize. These comments suggest that increased awareness of how
one’s behaviors may be interpreted by members of another occupation
may help in preventing the buildup of interoccupational tension. At the
same time, the interviews also highlight how difficult it may be to change
strongly internalized occupational dispositions, with GP#6 noting that
despite increased self-awareness, “it is too late [for me] to change,
sorry . . . If I had done it [leadership training] ten years ago, I might ’ve
been able to modify my behavior. By then it was too late.”
Discussion
We examined how occupational dispositions may contribute to inhibit-
ing mandated role change implementation. Our findings suggest that
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misaligned occupational dispositions may lead to the emergence of
interoccupational tension, which actors address by reducing interoccu-
pational interaction, thereby undermining actors’ abilities to effectively
alter their roles. In demonstrating the importance of misaligned dispo-
sitions in inhibiting mandated role change implementation, our findings
provide an alternative to the predominant view that role change is pri-
marily dependent on the outcomes of jurisdictional battles between
occupational groups (Abbott, 1988).
Attributing change implementation dynamics to occupational dispo-
sitions departs from a model of human motivation and action that is
grounded in rationality and protection of self- and/or group interests
(Coleman, 2009). This rational actor model is either implicit or explicit
in accounts focused on jurisdictional conflict (Abbott, 1988) as well as
much of the broader sociological literature on professions and profes-
sional work (Freidson, 1988; Starr, 1984) and has been a subject of
some prior critique (Eyal, 2013). Although our findings do not deny
the potential relevance of such interests, we argue that foregrounding
nonreflective habitual behavior in interoccupational interactions adds
important insights about mandated role change implementation that
would otherwise remain hidden.
Conclusion
Given the broad importance of dispositions in shaping social interac-
tion across a wide range of domains and contexts (Bourdieu, 1985), we
anticipate that dispositions would play a complementary role to juris-
dictional disputes in shaping the implementation of a broad range of
mandated role changes. However, there are boundary conditions defin-
ing where dispositions might be more likely to feature prominently.
Dispositions may be particularly useful for understanding the difficulty
of effectively implementing change in situations where actors do not feel
that their occupational interests are being threatened. This can include
cases where mandated role changes give higher status occupations
opportunities to hive off lower status scut work (Huising, 2015).
In our case, the policy of granting health-care systems management
responsibilities to GPs appeared to trigger minimal jurisdictional con-
flict between them and administrators because the former were not
losing control over their clinical domain and administrators had limited
control over their local health-care system anyway.
Dispositions and how they shape interactions may also be relatively
more important when implementing mandated role change creates
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situations involving members of different occupational groups that do
not habitually interact. Our article examines the role of nonprofession-
als who normally interact infrequently with clinicians. In doing so, we
develop a contrast to traditional depictions of professionals as being in
a position to resist and subvert change (e.g., Givan, 2016; Kellogg,
2011) and administrators as mere implementers (Lipsky, 1983).
Instead, we find that the latter may (perhaps unintentionally) play a
role in inhibiting change. Yet, our focus on interactions involving
administrators raises the question of whether this occupational group
is in some ways unique or noncomparable to lower status clinical pro-
fessionals. Would we expect the dynamics we identified to emerge in the
context of mandated role change involving physicians and nurses?
Arguably, due to somewhat shared educational experiences, the
degree of dispositional misalignment between different types of clini-
cians is generally lower than between clinicians and nonclinicians,
potentially reducing the number of situations in which actors judge
each other’s behavior as inappropriate. Moreover, physicians’ and
nurses’ experiences of working together in their day-to-day work is
likely to contribute to shared understandings (Brown & Duguid,
1991) that may prevent the buildup of interoccupational tension.
In summary, while we argue that our model is transferable to other
settings, the difference between GPs and administrators may represent
an extreme case of dispositional misalignment that results in interoccu-
pational tension becoming particularly salient. We call for more empir-
ical studies of mandated role change implementation involving diverse
occupational groups to assess the transferability of our model.
Our findings also have implications concerning the managerializa-
tion of professional work and professionals’ experiences of assuming
increased administrative and managerial responsibilities (Waring &
Currie, 2009). Much of this literature focuses on the individuals who
experience transitions to managerial roles and the identity-related ten-
sion that results from adopting multiple, potentially conflicting roles
(McGivern et al., 2015). In addition, the risk of clinicians being ostra-
cized by members of their own occupational group once they assume
managerial roles has been documented (Thorne, 1997). Our case instead
highlights that challenges may arise even when professionals seem eager
to assume aspects of nonprofessional work—and that success may
depend on how interoccupational interactions evolve.
In addition, our analysis presents an interesting contrast to prevail-
ing assumptions about the impact of change initiatives on dispositions.
Specifically, mandated changes are often theorized as causing
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disruptions that call into question traditional behaviors (Kotter, 1995).
In other words, actors may become aware of how their dispositions are
no longer aligned with their environment, triggering adjustments.
Alternatively, dispositions may simply fail to adapt to changing circum-
stances (Strand & Lizardo, 2017). Our analysis suggests a further pos-
sibility, namely that mandated changes may reinforce existing
dispositions—such as a shift in responsibilities confirming GPs’, and
denying administrators’, abilities to enact discretion. This finding has
important implications for understanding unanticipated consequences
of change initiatives (Balogun, 2006; McKinley & Scherer, 2000;
Wiedner et al., 2017) and why supposedly radical change initiatives
may represent continuity (Brunsson, 2009).
Finally, beyond its theoretical significance in terms of understanding
mandated change implementation processes, our focus on the impor-
tance of disposition, and dispositional misalignment has important
implications for policy design and implementation. As reflective com-
ments from GPs in our findings show, actors’ increased awareness of (a)
their own dispositions, (b) how their behavior may be interpreted neg-
atively by others, and (c) how this may ultimately contribute to under-
mining desired change efforts and can support the suppression of
actions that may generate interoccupational tension. This suggests
that efforts to implement role changes may need to focus on supporting
actors’ self-awareness, empathy, and reflexivity so as to minimize the
potential for interoccupational tension to develop, as well as to help
actors constructively deal with tension once it has emerged.
Via our analysis of local responses to the policy of shifting health-
care systems management responsibilities from administrators to GPs
in the NHS, we have shown that misaligned occupational dispositions
may contribute to inhibiting mandated role change implementation due
to the buildup of interoccupational tension. By highlighting the role of
occupational dispositions in shaping the negotiation of mandated role
change implementation between members of different occupations, we
add important insights to role changes in professionalized settings in
general, and health-care systems management in particular.
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank Ariel Avgar, Dan Cornfield, and the anonymous reviewers for
their valuable comments and guidance. We also thank the participants at the
Consequences of Change in Healthcare for Organizations, Workers, and
Patients Conference and at the Tenth International Symposium on Process
24 Work and Occupations 0(0)
Organization Studies for their insightful feedback and suggestions on earlier
versions of this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the
research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article: Rene Wiedner was funded by the
U.K. National Institute for Health Research Collaborations for Leadership in
Applied Health Research and Care Cambridgeshire and Peterborough. The
views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and not necessarily
those of the National Health Service in England, the National Institute for
Health Research, or the U.K. Government’s Department of Health.
ORCID iD
Rene Wiedner https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4060-1244
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
References
Abbott, A. (1988). The system of professions: An essay on the division of expert
labour. University of Chicago Press.
Allen, D. (2000). Doing occupational demarcation the “boundary-work” of
nurse managers in a district general hospital. Journal of Contemporary
Ethnography, 29(3), 326–356. https://doi.org/10.1177/089124100129023936
Alvesson, M., & K€arreman, D. (2007). Constructing mystery: Empirical matters
in theory development. The Academy of Management Review, 32(4),
1265–1281. https://doi.org/10.2307/20159366
Anteby, M., Chan, C. K., & DiBenigno, J. (2016). Three lenses on occupations
and professions in organizations: Becoming, doing, and relating. The
Academy of Management Annals, 10(1), 183–244. https://doi.org/10.1080/
19416520.2016.1120962
Balogun, J. (2006). Managing change: Steering a course between intended strat-
egies and unanticipated outcomes. Long Range Planning, 39(1), 29–49.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2005.02.010
BBC News Online. (2012). Which is the world’s biggest employer? http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17429786
Wiedner et al. 25
Bechky, B. A. (2003). Sharing meaning across occupational communities: The
transformation of understanding on a production floor. Organization
Science, 14(3), 312–330. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.14.3.312.15162
Bosk, C. L. L. (2003). Forgive and remember: Managing medical failure (2nd
ed.). University of Chicago Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1985). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste.
Harvard University Press.
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). An invitation to reflexive sociology
(1st ed.). University Of Chicago Press.
Brown, J. S., & Duguid, P. (1991). Organizational learning and communities-of-
practice: Toward a unified way of working, learning, and innovation.
Organization Science, 2(1), 40–57. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.40
Brunsson, N. (2009). Reform as routine: Organizational change and stability in
the modern world. Oxford University Press.
Carr-Hill, R., Jenkins-Clarke, S., Dixon, P., & Pringle, M. (1998). Do minutes
count? Consultation lengths in general practice. Journal of Health Services
Research & Policy, 3(4), 207–213. https://doi.org/10.1177/135581969800300405
Chreim, S.,Williams, B. E. (B. )., & Hinings, C. R. (B. ). (2007). Interlevel influences
on the reconstruction of professional role identity. Academy of Management
Journal, 50(6), 1515–1539. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2007.28226248
Cohen, A., & Light, D. (2003). Policy paper 1: Commissioning mental health
services: Experiences from the USA. The Sainsbury Centre for Mental
Health. http://www.centreformentalhealth.org.uk/publications/commission
ing_mh_services.aspx?ID=341
Coleman, J. (2009). Individual interests and collective action: Studies in rational-
ity and social change (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Currie, G., Finn, R., & Martin, G. (2010). Role transition and the interaction of
relational and social identity: New nursing roles in the English NHS.
Organization Studies, 31(7), 941–961. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840610373199
Czarniawska, B. (2007). Shadowing: And other techniques for doing fieldwork in
modern societies. Copenhagen Business School Press.
Department of Health. (2005). Commissioning a patient-led NHS [WhitePaper].
Department of Health. (2010). Equity and excellence: Liberating the NHS
[WhitePaper]. http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/
PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_117353
DiBenigno, J. (2018). Anchored personalization inmanaging goal conflict between
professional groups: The case of U.S. army mental health care. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 63(3), 526–569. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839217714024
Dixon, A., & Ham, C. (2010). ‘Liberating the NHS’: The right prescription in a
cold climate? King’s Fund. www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/field/field_
publication_file/liberating-nhs-right-prescription-cold-climate-oct10.pdf
Dougherty, D. (1992). Interpretive barriers to successful product innovation in
large firms. Organization Science, 3(2), 179–202.
26 Work and Occupations 0(0)
Edmondson, A. C. (2003). Speaking up in the operating room: How team leaders
promote learning in interdisciplinary action teams. Journal of Management
Studies, 40(6), 1419–1452. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00386
Eisenstadt, S. N., Bar-Yosef, R., & Alder, C. (1967). Analysis of processes of role
change (1st ed.). Routledge.
Eyal, G. (2013). For a sociology of expertise: The social origins of the autism
epidemic. American Journal of Sociology, 118(4), 863–907. https://doi.org/10.
1086/668448
Fayard, A.-L., Stigliani, I., & Bechky, B. A. (2017). How nascent occupations
construct a mandate: The case of service designers’ ethos. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 62(2), 270–303. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839216665805
Ferlie, E., Fitzgerald, L., Wood, M., & Hawkins, C. (2005). The nonspread of
innovations: The mediating role of professionals. Academy of Management
Journal, 48(1), 117–134.
Flynn, R., & Williams, G. (1997). Contracting for health. In R. Flynn & G.
Williams (Eds.), Contracting for health: Quasi-markets and the National
Health Service (pp. 1–13). Oxford University Press.
Freidson, E. (1988). Profession of medicine: A study of the sociology of applied
knowledge. University of Chicago Press.
Freidson, E. (2001). Professionalism, the third logic. Polity Press.
Gabbay, J., & Le May, A. (2004). Evidence based guidelines or collectively
constructed ‘mindlines?’—Ethnographic study of knowledge management
in primary care. British Medical Journal, 329(7473), 1013A–1016A. https://
doi.org/10.1136/bmj.329.7473.1013
Givan, R. K. (2016). The challenge to change: Reforming health care on the front
line in the United States and the United Kingdom. ILR Press.
Hughes, E. C. (1981). Men and their work. Greenwood Press.
Huising, R. (2015). To hive or to hold? Producing professional authority
through scut work. Administrative Science Quarterly, 60(2), 263–299.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839214560743
Huq, J.-L., Reay, T., & Chreim, S. (2017). Protecting the paradox of interpro-
fessional collaboration. Organization Studies, 38(3–4), 513–538. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0170840616640847
Kellogg, K. C. (2011). Challenging operations: Medical reform and resistance in
surgery. University of Chicago Press.
Kellogg, K. C. (2014). Brokerage professions and implementing reform in an
age of experts. American Sociological Review, 79(5), 912–941.
Kirschner, S. R., & Lachicotte, W. S. (2001). Managing managed care: Habitus,
hysteresis and the end(s) of psychotherapy. Culture, Medicine and
Psychiatry, 25(4), 441–456.
Kitchener, M. (2000). The ‘bureaucratization’ of professional roles: The case of
clinical directors in UK hospitals. Organization, 7(1), 129–154. https://doi.
org/10.1177/135050840071007
Wiedner et al. 27
Kotter, J. P. (1995). Leading change: Why transformation efforts fail. Harvard
Business Review, 73(2), 59–67.
Lawrence, P. R., & Lorsch, J. W. (1967). Differentiation and Integration in
Complex Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 12(1), 1–47.
Lipsky, M. (1983). Street-level bureaucracy: The dilemmas of the individual in
public service. Russell Sage Foundation.
Mantere, S., & Ketokivi, M. (2013). Reasoning in organization science.
Academy of Management Review, 38(1), 70–89. https://doi.org/10.5465/
amr.2011.0188
McDermott, A. M., Fitzgerald, L., & Buchanan, D. A. (2013). Beyond accep-
tance and resistance: Entrepreneurial change agency responses in policy
implementation. British Journal of Management, 24, 93–115.
McDermott, I., Checkland, K., Coleman, A., Osipovic, D., Petsoulas, C., &
Perkins, N. (2017). Engaging GPs in commissioning: Realist evaluation of
the a experiences of Clinical Commissioning Groups in the English NHS.
Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 22(1), 4–11.
McGivern, G., Currie, G., Ferlie, E., Fitzgerald, L., & Waring, J. (2015).
Hybrid manager-professionals’ identity work: The maintenance and hybrid-
ization of medical professionalism in managerial contexts. Public
Administration, 93(2), 412–432. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12119
McKinley, W., & Scherer, A. G. (2000). Some unanticipated consequences of
organizational restructuring. The Academy of Management Review, 25(4),
735–752. https://doi.org/10.2307/259202
McNulty, T., & Ferlie, E. (2004). Process transformation: Limitations to radical
organizational change within public service organizations. Organization
Studies, 25(8), 1389–1412. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840604046349
Menchik, D. A., & Meltzer, D. O. (2010). The cultivation of esteem and retriev-
al of scientific knowledge in physician networks. Journal of Health and Social
Behavior, 51(2), 137–152. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022146510372231
Morgan, G. (2006). Images of Organization (4th revised edition). Sage.
Nancarrow, S. A. (2015). Six principles to enhance health workforce flexibility.
Human Resources for Health, 13(1), 9. https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-4491-13-9
Nancarrow, S. A., Booth, A., Ariss, S., Smith, T., Enderby, P., & Roots, A.
(2013). Ten principles of good interdisciplinary team work. Human
Resources for Health, 11(1), 19. https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-4491-11-19
Nancarrow, S. A., & Borthwick, A. M. (2005). Dynamic professional bound-
aries in the healthcare workforce. Sociology of Health & Illness, 27(7),
897–919. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9566.2005.00463.x
Nelsen, B. J., & Barley, S. R. (1997). For love or money? Commodification and
the construction of an occupational mandate. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 42(4), 619–653. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393652
Nigam, A., Huising, R., & Golden, B. (2016). Explaining the selection of rou-
tines for change during organizational search. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 61(4), 551–583. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839216653712
28 Work and Occupations 0(0)
Oborn, E., & Dawson, S. (2010). Learning across communities of practice: An
examination of multidisciplinary work. British Journal of Management,
21(4), 843–858. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00684.x
Okhuysen, G. A., & Bechky, B. A. (2009). Coordination in organizations: An
integrative perspective. The Academy of Management Annals, 3(1), 463–502.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520903047533
Ozcan, P., Han, S., & Graebner, M. E. (2017). Single cases: The what, why, and
how. In R. Mir & S. Jain (Eds.), The Routledge companion to qualitative
research in organization studies (pp. 92–112). Routledge.
Pouthier, V. (2017). Griping and joking as identification rituals and tools for
engagement in cross-boundary team meetings. Organization Studies, 38(6),
753–774. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840616685358
Pratt, M. G., Rockmann, K. W., & Kaufmann, J. B. (2006). Constructing
professional identity: The role of work and identity learning cycles in the
customization of identity among medical residents. Academy of Management
Journal, 49(2), 235–262. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2006.20786060
Reay, T., Golden-Biddle, K., & Germann, K. (2006). Legitimizing a new role:
Small wins and microprocesses of change. Academy of Management Journal,
49(5), 977–998.
Siggelkow, N. (2007). Persuasion with case studies. Academy of Management
Journal, 50(1), 20–24.
Starr, P. (1984). The social transformation of American medicine: The rise of a
sovereign profession and the making of a vast industry (Reprint edition).
Basic Books.
Strand, M., & Lizardo, O. (2017). The hysteresis effect: Theorizing mismatch in
action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 47(2), 164–194. https://
doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12117
Thorne, M. L. (1997). Being a clinical director: First among equals or just a go-
between? Health Services Management Research, 10(4), 205–215. https://doi.
org/10.1177/095148489701000401
Timmermans, S. (2003). The gold standard: The challenge of evidence-based
medicine and standardization in health care. Temple University Press.
Turner, R. H. (1990). Role change. Annual Review of Sociology, 16(1), 87–110.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.16.080190.000511
Waring, J., & Currie, G. (2009). Managing expert knowledge: Organizational
challenges and managerial futures for the UK medical profession.
Organization Studies, 30(7), 755–778. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0170840609104819
Weinberg, D. B. (2004). Code green: Money-driven hospitals and the dismantling
of nursing. ILR Press.
West, D. (2011). GP conflicts of interest could ‘badly undermine’ confidence in
NHS. Health Service Journal. http://www.hsj.co.uk/home/commissioning/
gp-conflicts-of-interest-could-badly-undermine-confidence-in-nhs/5035381.
article#
Wiedner et al. 29
Wiedner, R., & Ansari, S. (2017). Appreciating emergence and serendipity in
qualitative research: Resisting the urge to follow set plans. In R. Mir & S.
Jain (Eds.), The Routledge companion to qualitative research in organization
studies (pp. 343–357). Routledge.
Wiedner, R., Barrett, M., & Oborn, E. (2017). The emergence of change in
unexpected places: Resourcing across organizational practices in strategic
change. Academy of Management Journal, 60(3), 823–854.
Wiener, C. (2000). The elusive quest: Accountability in hospitals (1st ed.). Aldine
Transaction.
Woodin, J., & Wade, E. (2007). Towards world class commissioning competency:
A report produced for West Midlands strategic health authority. University of
Birmingham.
Xyrichis, A., Lowton, K., & Rafferty, A. M. (2017). Accomplishing profession-
al jurisdiction in intensive care: An ethnographic study of three units.
Social Science & Medicine, 181, 102–111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socs
cimed.2017.03.047
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods (3rd ed.). Sage.
Author Biographies
Rene Wiedner is an associate professor and a member of the Process,
Practice and Institutions Research Programme at Warwick Business
School, University of Warwick. His research focuses on change, collab-
oration, and innovation, mainly in health care and the creative indus-
tries. He received his PhD from the University of Cambridge.
Amit Nigam is a professor of management at Cass Business School,
City, University of London. His research focuses on processes of orga-
nizational and institutional change, primarily in health care. He is par-
ticularly interested in the social dynamics within and across professions
during change.
Jose Bento da Silva is an assistant professor of organization studies at
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick. His research focuses
on institutions and institutionalization processes.
30 Work and Occupations 0(0)
